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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal linear taxes on labor income and savings in a two-
period life-cycle model with ex ante identical households, endogenous leisure de-
mands in both periods, and general processes of skill shocks over the life cycle. We
demonstrate that the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem breaks down under risk. Capital
taxes are employed besides labor income taxes for two distinct reasons: i) capital
taxes reduce labor supply distortions on second-period labor supply, since second-
period labor supply and saving are substitutes, ii) capital taxes insure rst-period
income risk, although this benet is partially o-set because rst-period labor sup-
ply and saving are complements. Our results imply that (retirement) saving should
not be actuarially fair.
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1 Introduction
Should capital income be taxed or not? This is one of the oldest and most important
questions in public nance. Ever since the seminal work of Pigou (1928), the desirability
of taxing capital income has been a controversial issue. And, as of today, controversies
still abound in the economics literature. Mirrlees et al. (2011) recommend in the nal
chapter of the Mirrlees Review not to tax the (normal) returns on saving, while Banks
and Diamond (2010), writing a chapter in that very same Mirrlees Review, argue in favor
of taxing the (normal) return to savings. Similarly, Mankiw et al. (2009) in the Journal
of Economic Perspectives argue that capital income should remain untaxed, whereas
Diamond and Saez (2011), in that very same journal, strongly recommend taxing capital
incomes.
Our paper contributes to this long-standing debate in public nance by highlighting
the role of non-insurable labor income risks. We demonstrate that under risk the optimal
capital tax is always non-zero, and should be positive under empirically grounded con-
ditions. We believe that our ndings have potentially important policy implications for
the debate on whether capital income should be taxed, how retirement savings should be
taxed, and how pension reforms should be designed.
The argument against taxing capital incomes relies on two strands in the literature.
The rst strand originates from Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) who analyze determin-
istic innite-horizon models. These authors show that taxes on capital income can be seen
as an ever-increasing tax on consumption in the more distant future. Ramsey-principles
therefore insist that in the long-run capital income should not be taxed. Since taxes on
capital incomes are dierentiated consumption taxes, these results are intimately linked
to the second strand in the literature, which analyzes the desirability of dierentiated
commodity taxes. In particular, Sandmo (1974, 1976), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), and
Deaton (1979) have demonstrated that commodity taxes should not be dierentiated,
even in nite-horizon models, as long as preferences over consumption goods are weakly
separable from leisure under non-linear income taxation. The requirements are stronger
when only linear instruments are available. In that case, the subutility function over
consumption goods needs to be homothetic as well. This result is generally referred to in
the literature as the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem.1
1Numerous other papers have elucidated the conditions under which capital-income taxes are not
optimally zero in deterministic models. If horizons are not innite and preferences do not meet the re-
quired separability conditions, capital income might be taxed or subsidized on a net basis. In particular,
2Our paper investigates the desirability of capital-income taxes when insurance markets
are missing and individuals are subject to earnings risk. To that end, we develop a two-
period life-cycle model where individuals optimally decide on consumption and leisure
choices in both periods. Individuals could be hit by a non-insurable skill shock in each
period of their life cycle. Ex ante, all individuals are identical. Ex post they dier due
to the realizations of these skill shocks. We allow for completely general skill-processes
that could feature persistence or mean reversion over the life cycle. Capital markets are
assumed to be perfect. A government with full commitment designs an optimal social
insurance package. Since the government is unable to verify the skill shocks, it cannot
employ state-dependent instruments. Consequently, individualized lump-sum taxes are
ruled out, and the government has to resort to distortionary tax instruments. In addi-
tion, we assume that taxes on labor and capital incomes are linear and age-independent.
Designing an optimal social insurance policy is thus a second-best problem and the gov-
ernment needs to trade-o incentives to work or to save against the benets of social
insurance.
We demonstrate that capital-income taxes are optimally non-zero in an optimal so-
cial insurance package in a wide class of standard two-period life-cycle models with risk.
Therefore, capital-income taxes should always be employed even when adopting prefer-
ences that render capital-income taxes zero in the absence of risk. This result demon-
strates that the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem breaks down under risk. In addi-
tion, capital-income taxes should be positive under weak conditions that are likely to be
fullled in practice.
We identify three mechanisms that determine whether capital-income taxes should
optimally be employed in an optimal social insurance program: i) reducing labor-tax
distortions on second-period labor supply, ii) (co-)insuring rst-period labor-income risk,
and iii) containing intertemporal labor supply distortions. To understand these three
mechanisms, we will analyze two sub-models of our more general model.
First, we assume that labor supply in the rst period is exogenous. In this setting,
second-period labor supply can be interpreted as the retirement decision. We will refer
to this case as the `working-for-retirement' model. It corresponds to the setting analyzed
in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) and also resembles the models of Diamond and Mirrlees
when marginal rate of substitution between future and current consumption increases with labor eort,
capital incomes should optimally be taxed so as to (partially) o-set the tax distortions of the income
tax on labor supply. See for example Ordover and Phelps (1979), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Erosa
and Gervais (2002), and Diamond (2006). Aiyagari (1995) allows for incomplete nancial markets such
that individuals can be borrowing constrained. Capital-income taxes redistribute resources from uncon-
strained towards constrained phases of the life-cycle, and thereby help to complete missing borrowing
markets. Saez (2002), Boadway and Pestieau (2003), Diamond (2006), and Blomquist and Christiansen
(2008) allow for heterogeneous preferences. They show that when discount rates decrease with ability,
it is optimal to tax capital income in a redistributive program even under separable preferences. In case
governments cannot commit to future tax plans, optimal time-consistent capital taxes might also be
(very) high, see, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980).
3(1978, 1986) in which individuals can retire early. The rst role of taxing capital income
is to o-set the tax distortions on labor supply (retirement), since a lower level of saving
stimulates labor supply (later retirement) due to intertemporal wealth eects. Conse-
quently, capital-income taxes directly alleviate the distortions of labor-income taxation
on labor supply. The government trades o lower distortions in labor supply against
larger distortions in saving.
Second, we analyze the case where second-period labor supply is assumed to be ex-
ogenous, and individuals only choose leisure in the rst period. This is what we call the
`saving-for-retirement' model. This case extends the models analyzed by Ordover and
Phelps (1979) and Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) to a setting with income risk. In the
saving-for-retirement model, subsidies on saving would reduce distortions in labor sup-
ply of the young workers. Based on the same reasoning from the working-for-retirement
model, one could therefore be tempted to conclude that subsidies on saving would be
optimal, as this would alleviate tax distortions on labor supply. However, this turns
out not to be the case. The reason is that capital-income taxes feature social insurance
gains, since savings are stochastic, and reect the severity of the skill shock individuals
experience during the rst period of their life cycle. Hence, the second role of capital-
income taxes is to complement the labor-income tax in insuring income risk. The optimal
capital-income tax trades o the distortions in both saving and labor supply, on the one
hand, against the social gains of income insurance, on the other hand. Taxes on saving
are thus optimal so as to smooth the dead-weight costs of social insurance over both the
labor and capital tax bases.
In our full model, leisure demands are endogenous in both periods of the life cycle.
The optimal capital tax tends to be positive for both reasons discussed in the two special
cases. However, since both leisure demands are now endogenous, the capital tax entails
an additional distortion in the intertemporal leisure decision, besides the saving decision.
This third impact of capital-income taxes tends to reduce the optimal capital tax. The
optimal capital tax always remains unambiguously positive, however, as long as life-time
labor supply increases with the capital tax. This is the case, as long as second-period
labor supply increases more than rst-period labor supply decreases. Empirical evidence
suggests that this condition indeed holds.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, by restrict-
ing the analysis to linear instruments without record keeping, and allowing for general
skill-processes, we add relevant real-world features to the analysis of optimal capital-
income taxation under risk. Non-linear policies have been extensively analyzed in, for
example, Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986) and papers in the `new dynamic public
nance' literature; see, e.g., da Costa and Werning (2002), Golosov et al. (2003, 2006),
Kocherlakota (2005), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), and Di-
amond (2006). These papers show that labor supply optimally carries a wedge (i.e., is
4distorted) for insurance purposes. Moreover, there is an intertemporal wedge in consump-
tion choices, indicating a potential role for capital-income taxation. However, non-linear
instruments are very demanding in terms of information, as they require veriability of
labor incomes and savings at the individual level. Furthermore, in dynamic optimal-tax
models with risk, optimal second-best allocations cannot be implemented with standard
non-linear tax schedules unless specic assumptions are made on the dynamics of the
skill process or on the set of available government instruments, such as record keeping.
See, for example, Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet (2006),
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), and Blomquist and Micheletto (2008). In the real world,
capital-income taxes are generally not based on record keeping and are often linear. Gov-
ernments generally do not keep tax records, even in most advanced countries. Moreover,
Blomquist and Micheletto (2008) and Bastani et al. (2011) argue that non-linear taxes
on savings introduce arbitrage possibilities, which cannot be eliminated if the government
cannot verify capital incomes at the individual level.2 By analyzing linear instruments
we avoid these implementability issues. Moreover, as we do not need to worry about
implementation issues, we can allow for completely general skill processes. We are able
to demonstrate that the optimality of a capital wedge is robust to (very) large deviations
from the informational requirements adopted in non-linear tax frameworks.
Second, in a series of seminal papers, Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b, 1999a,
1999b) have investigated the desirability of commodity tax dierentiation in risky en-
vironments. Using linear policies, Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) have shown that the
Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem fails in a special case of our more general model. In partic-
ular, Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) argue that commodity tax dierentiation helps to
oset over- or underconsumption { relative to the rst-best rules { of pre-committed and
post-committed goods, i.e., goods that are consumed before or after the skill shock ma-
terializes. Translated to our setting, this would imply that the government would like to
tax precautionary saving. However, in our view, their explanation for this result needs
to be revised. We demonstrate that in their setting, the capital tax does not reduce the
exposure to labor market risk. Hence, the capital tax has no insurance gains, while up-
setting the optimal private response to earnings risk by taxing savings in a distortionary
way. Instead, we show that the capital tax boosts labor supply, and thereby reduces labor
supply distortions in social insurance. Consequently, positive capital taxes are optimal to
reduce labor market distortions, and are not employed to reduce precautionary saving.3;4
2These authors analyze (age-dependent) non-linear labor-income taxes and also demonstrate that
there is generally a role for (linear) capital taxation.
3Cremer and Gahvari (1995b) show that the results carry over to non-linear instruments as well.
Cremer and Gahvari (1999a, 1999b) extend their previous approaches by allowing for dierent types of
commitment. Nevertheless, also in these papers, their main argument is that dierentiated commodity
taxes mitigate socially inecient under- and over-consumption.
4In an unpublished manuscript, da Costa and Werning (2002) also argue that the interpretation of
Cremer and Gahvari (1995b) needs to be revised. They point out that dierential commodity taxation
5Third, by analyzing the optimal tax treatment of (pension) saving, we also contribute
to the analysis of Cremer et al. (2004, 2008) who studied the optimal taxation of retire-
ment, but did not analyze the optimal tax treatment of saving. Our results strengthen
their ndings by demonstrating that not only retirement choices should be distorted, but
also that (private) retirement saving should optimally be actuarially unfair. A tax on
saving alleviates the distortions in early retirement choices caused by social insurance.
This nding has substantial policy relevance. In the upcoming decades, many countries
are confronted with the ageing of work forces, resulting in nancing problems for PAYG-
pensions and health care. Our results indicate that if governments aim to promote later
retirement, they should not strengthen incentives to save for retirement at the same time.
Stronger incentives for retirement saving would promote earlier retirement, not later re-
tirement. Similarly, if governments would like to promote labor supply of working-age
individuals, they should not stimulate (pension) savings either. For a given level of social
insurance, the rise in the tax burden needed to compensate the saving subsidies would re-
duce labor supply of working-age individuals more than the saving subsidies could oset.
Thus, the trade-o between incentives and insurance worsens.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline
model. Section 3 derives the optimal tax rules for optimal labor and capital taxes.
Section 4 derives the optimal tax structure in the `saving-for-retirement' model. Section
5 derives the optimal tax structure in the `working-for-retirement' model. Section 6 gives
the solution to the complete model. Section 7 concludes. Three appendices contain
technical details of the derivations.
2 Model
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of innitely small households who live for two periods. In each pe-
riod households decide upon their consumption and labor supply. Perfect capital markets
allow individuals to borrow and lend at constant real interest rate r. In addition, labor
markets are frictionless and the wage per eciency unit of labor equals one.5 Insurance
markets to insure idiosyncratic labor income risks are missing, which can be due to moral
hazard, adverse selection, and contract incompleteness (see, e.g., Sinn, 1996). By the law
of large numbers idiosyncratic individual risk washes out in aggregate and there is no
aggregate (systematic) risk.
Households are identical ex ante, but not ex post. In each period i = 1;2, their
helps to relax incentive constraints associated with insurance. In the conclusion of this paper, we argue
that relaxing incentive constraints is indeed equivalent to boosting labor supply.
5Constant real interest and wage rates would be obtained in a small open economy with perfect capital
mobility and perfect substitution of dierent labor types in production.
6productivity per hour worked or `skill' i is stochastic.6 The joint set of possible real-
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the set of realizations of i for i = 1;2. p() is
the probability distribution function, which attaches a strictly positive probability p()
to skill history . The conditional probability that 2 is realized given 1 is denoted by
p(2j1). The (life-time) expectation E[:] over variable x() as of period one is dened
as E[x()] 
P
 x()p(), whereas the conditional expectation of a variable as of pe-
riod two, given a particular realization of the skill shock 1 in period one, is denoted by
E[x(2)j1] 
P
2 x(2)p(2j1). We allow for fully general stochastic processes for the
evolution of skills; hence, there could be persistence or mean reversion in skill shocks over
time. There is strong empirical evidence for persistence in incomes of individuals, see,
e.g., Meghir and Pistaferri (2011). Persistence in income shocks has signicant eects on
welfare as these shocks cannot be perfectly smoothed out over the life cycle, in contrast to
temporary, idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, persistence in skills has important conse-
quences for the implementability of non-linear tax schedules, see the introduction. While
we allow for completely general skill processes, we are able to implement allocations us-
ing simple, linear tax instruments. For notational simplicity we harmlessly normalize the
expectation of the rst skill shock to one: E[1]  1.
ci denotes consumption in period i = 1;2. Similarly, li is labor supply in period i. In
period one, households choose labor supply and consumption before the shock realizes,
hence c1 and l1 are `committed' goods (Cremer and Gahvari, 1995a, 1995b). When
entering the second period, households carry forward a stochastic level of assets a(1) and
rst determine how much labor l2 (1) to supply. Hence, second-period labor supply only
depends on shock 1 and not on 2. Second-period consumption c2 (1;2) is determined
residually.
This particular sequencing of decisions and skill shocks has been chosen based on the
following considerations. First, the model would collapse to a standard heterogenous-
agent model (without uncertainty), if neither rst-period consumption nor rst-period
leisure would be committed before the rst skill shock realizes (cf. Cremer and Gah-
vari, 1999a). We follow Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b, 1999a, 1999b) by assuming
that rst-period consumption is the committed good.7 This implies that saving becomes
stochastic, and absorbs part of the rst-period skill shock. Second, second-period con-
sumption should be determined residually, i.e., after the second skill shock realizes, so as
6We ignore any risk in the interest rate. Introducing risky interest rates would strengthen the case
for positive capital income taxation, since its insurance benets increase.
7If there is no commitment in consumption at all, that is, all consumption decisions are made after
the resolution of all uncertainty, then the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem would be applicable, and capital
income should remain untaxed, cf. Cremer and Gahvari (1999a), da Costa and Werning (2002), and
Banks and Diamond (2006).
7to close the model. This leaves us with a choice as to when labor supply is chosen in both
periods: either before or after the skill shocks realize. It turned out to be technically
slightly simpler to assume that labor supply is chosen before the skill-shock realizes in
each period, while doing so is without loss of generality.8
We assume that expected utility U is an additively separable function over consump-
tion and labor supply in both periods (see also, e.g., Cremer and Gahvari, 1995a, 1995b;
Golosov et al., 2003, 2006; Diamond, 2006):









i < 0; u
000
i > 0; 0 <  < 1; i = 1;2;
where sub-utilities ui and vi satisfy the Inada conditions.  is the discount factor, which
captures the time-preference of the household. We assume decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion in consumption, which necessarily implies u000
i > 0. This utility function satises
the conditions for the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem in the absence of risk if sub-utility over
consumption is homothetic. Hence, if we nd a role for capital-income taxation assum-
ing homothetic consumption preferences we directly establish that the Atkinson-Stiglitz
theorem breaks down.
The government is unable to verify individual skill shocks. Therefore, it cannot em-
ploy individualized lump-sum taxes. Instead, it has to resort to taxing veriable labor
and capital incomes. Additionally, the government may employ a non-individualized
lump-sum tax (transfer). Thus, the government cannot insure skill shocks without incur-
ring eciency losses in labor supply and saving. Hence, the optimal insurance problem
features the well-known trade-o between insurance and incentives. We restrict the anal-
ysis to age-independent linear instruments.9 The informational requirements for linear
instruments are that the government only observes aggregate tax bases. In particular,
the government levies a linear tax on labor earnings in both periods at rate t. In addition,
the household receives a transfer T in the rst period. We do not explicitly allow for a
second-period income transfer. This instrument is redundant, since individuals can freely
allocate the rst-period transfer over the life cycle by having perfect access to capital
markets. Finally, a linear tax at rate  is levied on interest income from savings.10
8We have also derived the model when labor supply in each period is chosen after the shock has
realized, and the optimal tax expressions basically remain the same. In that case, they contain the
expected elasticity of rst-period labor income rather than the deterministic elasticity, and the expected
elasticity of second-period labor also depends on the second skill shock.
9An unpublished appendix { available upon request from the authors { demonstrates that the main
ndings are stronger if the government would be allowed to set age-dependent tax rates on labor income.
Intuitively, allowing for age-dependent labor-income taxes allows the government to o-set the distortions
of capital-income taxes on intertemporal labor supply choices by adjusting rst-period labor taxation,
thereby alleviating the distortion of the capital-income tax. As a result, capital taxes can be set higher.
See also the discussion at the end of Section 6.
10Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) study a similar setting using dierentiated commodity taxes. In the
8In the rst period, the household works and earns 1l1 in gross labor income. The rst-
period budget constraint states that total consumption equals net labor income minus
saving a(1):
c1 = (1   t)1l1 + T   a(1); 81 2 1: (2)
In the second-period, the household earns net labor income (1   t)2l2 (1) and interest
income ra(1) on assets carried forward from period one. Interest income is taxed at at
rate . Hence, the second-period budget reads as
c2 (2;1) = (1   t)2l2 (1) + (1 + (1   )r)a(1); 8 2 : (3)
In the remainder, we will employ R  1 + (1   )r to denote the net interest factor.
The household maximizes life-time utility by choosing the optimal levels of consump-
tion ci and labor supply li. We solve this problem backwards. Individuals enter the second
period with a stochastic level of assets a(1). Given this level of assets, and before the
second shock 2 materializes, the individual solves the subprogram:
max
fl2(1)g
E[u2((1   t)2l2 (1) + Ra(1))   v2 (l2)j1]; 81 2 1; (4)
which yields the following rst-order condition for second-period labor supply:
(1   t)E[u
0
2 (2)2j1] = v
0
2 (l2 (1)); 81 2 1: (5)
Consequently, we can write for the conditional expectation of second-period indirect
utility:
E[W (2;a(1))j1]  E
h
u2(^ c2)   v2(^ l2)
  1
i
; 81 2 1; (6)
where hats are used to denote the optimal values of c2 and l2. Taking expectations as of
period one on both sides yields expected indirect utility in period two as a function of
saving and the skill shocks:
E[W (a(1);1;2)]  E
h
















In the rst stage, individuals choose c1 and l1 before the shock 1 realizes, conditional
upon optimal choices in the second period. Hence, the individual solves the following
absence of non-labor income, such as bequests, uniform commodity taxes are equivalent to a proportional
tax on labor income, without taxes on capital income. Non-uniform commodity taxes are equivalent to




U = u1 (c1)   v1 (l1) + E[W (a(1);1;2)] (8)
= u1 (c1)   v1 (l1) + E[W ((1   t)1l1 + T   c1;1;2)];
where we substituted saving from the individual budget constraint in equation (2) in the
second line. The rst-period labor supply decision is governed by
v
0
1 (l1) = (1   t)RE[u
0
2 (c2 (1;2))1]: (9)




1 (c1) = RE[u
0
2 (c2 (1;2))]: (10)
A higher real return on saving R, or a higher discount factor , strengthen the incentive
to save by substituting current for future consumption.11
We introduce the risk premia of rst- and second-period labor supply as the normalized














i denotes the marginal welfare loss due to skill risk in period i as a fraction of E[i].
Indeed, (1   i)E[i] denotes the certainty equivalent of E[i]. Because marginal utility
of income is declining with income, the risk premia are non-negative in both periods.
Given that risk aects labor earnings in a multiplicative way, larger labor supply raises
the risk-exposure of households to labor market shocks.
Using these denitions, and recalling that E [1] = 1, we can derive that the labor










= (1   2)(1   t)E[2]: (14)
Hence, individuals get stronger incentives to supply more labor if the tax rate is lower or
if labor income is less risky (lower i). Larger labor market risk, as indicated by a larger
i, acts as an implicit tax on labor supply, since risk averse individuals reduce their labor
eort if the latter raises their exposure to skill shocks.
11Second-order conditions are always fullled due to the assumptions on preferences.
10Indirect expected utility of the household can be written as a function V over the
policy variables (T;t;R):
V (T;t;R)  u1(^ c1)   v1(^ l1) + E
h
u2(^ c2)   v2(^ l2)
i
; (15)
where the hats indicate the optimized values for consumption and labor, which follow
from solving the three rst-order conditions (5), (9), and (10), and the household budget
constraints (2) and (3) for c1, c2, l1, l2, and a. Note that we have suppressed the skill
shocks for notational simplicity. We will continue to do so in the remainder of the paper.
The derivatives of indirect utility with respect to the policy instruments follow from
















((1   1)(1   t)l1   c1 + T)
R
; (18)
where   u0
1 (c1) = RE[u0
2] is the marginal utility of private income, and 1 and 2 are













The insurance characteristic i gives the marginal welfare loss of income risk in period i
as a fraction of income in period i. In particular, (1 i)E[ili] is the certainty equivalent
of risky labor income ili.
To solve for the optimal tax structure below, we employ the risk-adjusted Slutsky
equations. To that end, we dene the expenditure function X (t;R;V ) as the minimum
level of non-labor income T required to attain expected indirect utility V . X (:) can be
obtained from setting X (t;R;V )  T for the optimal level of indirect utility V as given
in equation (15). The compensated demand functions are then dened as
l
c
i (t;R;V )  li (t;R;X (t;R;V )); (21)
c
c
i (t;R;V )  ci (t;R;X (t;R;V )); (22)
where the superscript c denotes a compensated change. By totally dierentiating the
compensated demand functions for given V , we obtain the following risk-adjusted Slutsky



















































































We assume a benevolent government, which has full commitment. We abstract from a
government-revenue requirement without loss of generality. The government optimally
provides social insurance by choosing policy instruments T, t, and R, such that expected
indirect utility V (T;t;R) of the household is maximized.
By the law of large numbers, individual idiosyncratic risks cancel in the aggregate.
The government is able to borrow in a perfect capital market at real interest rate r.
Hence, we nd that the intertemporal government budget constraint is given by
(1 + r)tl1 + tE[2l2] + (1 + r   R)[(1   t)l1   c1 + T] = (1 + r)T: (29)
All labor incomes are deterministic at the aggregate level. However, this neither implies
that the expectations operators on second-period labor income and on the second-period
skill shock can be separated, nor that E[2] can be normalized to one. The reason is that
skill shocks i may not be independent over time. If there is a correlation between both
skill shocks, second-period income will depend on the realization of the rst-period shock
1 and the second-period shock 2. As a result we have E[2l2 (1)] 6= E[2]E[l2 (1)].
Only if skill shocks are independent, i.e., if cov [1;2] = 0, we obtain E[2l2 (1)] =
E[2]E[l2 (1)].
123 Optimal taxation
The Lagrangian for maximizing social welfare is given by
max
fT;t;Rg
L  V (T;t;R) + [tl1(1 + r) + tE[2l2]] (30)
+ [(1 + r   R)((1   t)l1   c1 + T)   (1 + r)T];
where  is the deterministic shadow value of public resources.






















2]((1   1)Rl1 + (1   2)E[2l2]) + (Rl1 + E[2l2]) (32)

















2]((1   1)(1   t)l1   c1 + T)   ((1   t)l1   c1 + T) (33)













From the rst-order condition for the lump{sum transfer in equation (31) follows that
the expected social value of transferring one euro to the household (b) should be equal to

























Given that there is no revenue-requirement, all tax revenues are recycled in the form of
transfers. Thus, the transfer T will always be positive as long as tax rates on labor and
capital incomes are positive. Generally, it is not feasible to draw inferences about the size
of the transfer, as this depends on the total level of taxation of labor and capital incomes.
The analysis below does not permit us to compare tax levels across dierent (sub-)cases.
We will not return to this discussion in the following sections, as the rst-order condition
for the demogrant always remains the same.
The rst-order condition for the labor tax rate in (32) can be rewritten by substituting






@t in (23), (24) and (25), using the
denition for b in (34), and rearranging to nd
!1 + (1   !)2 +
t
1   t
(!"l1t + (1   !)"l2t) +
r=R
1   t
(!"l1t   "c1t) = 0; (35)
12As is standard in the optimal tax literature, we assume that these necessary rst-order conditions are




















c1 designate the compensated
labor tax elasticities of rst-period labor income, expected second-period labor income,
and rst-period consumption, respectively. ! 
Rl1
Rl1+E[2l2] is the share of rst-period
labor income in expected total labor income.  
Rc1
Rl1+E[2l2] is the share of rst-period
consumption in expected total labor income.
Similarly, we can simplify the rst-order condition for the capital tax in (33) by






@R (see equations (26)




(!"l1R + (1   !)"l2R) +
r=R
1   t



















c1 denote the compensated elastic-
ities of rst-period labor income, expected second-period labor income, and rst-period
consumption with respect to the interest factor, respectively.
In Appendix C, we formally derive all the behavioral elasticities, which we have signed
under three parameter restrictions, see also Table 1. Our parameter restrictions ensure
that the elasticities qualitatively have the same signs as the comparative statics results
of the model in the absence of income risk. Moreover, our restrictions ensure that the
signs of the elasticities are empirically warranted. The imposed parameter restrictions
are summarized in the last row of Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of elasticities
Elasticities
"c1t    



































































(1 t) + (1   1)!1"11 + (1   2)(1   !)2"21 > 0
  (1   1)!"1 + (1   2)(1   !)"2 > 0
   
(1 )=2
(1 t) + (1   1)!"1 (1   1)   (1   2)(1   !)"22
Parameter restrictions
i)  < 0, ii) 1  2, iii) 0
1 > 1 , 1 < 1
First, "c2R > 0 holds independently of any assumption on parameters. Hence, a larger
net return on saving boosts second period consumption. Moreover, "c1R < 0, since we
14assume  < 0 so that the standard substitution eect in saving dominates the insurance
eect of taxes on saving. The insurance eect stems from the fact that taxes on saving
help to reduce the exposure to rst-period labor market shocks by reducing the variance in
saving. Bernheim (2002) surveys many empirical studies estimating the interest elasticity
of saving. Empirical ndings indicate that the compensated interest elasticity of saving
is indeed positive.
Second, "l1t < 0 and "l2t < 0. Under wage risk, the elasticities of labor supply with
respect to the labor tax are generally ambiguous. By reducing the variance in earnings,
a higher tax reduces the risk-exposure of individuals to adverse labor market shocks so
that labor supply is ceteris paribus stimulated (see also Menezes and Wang, 2005). The









i ]E[i]. This elasticity measures the percentage change in
the certainty equivalent of wages with respect to a one-percent change in expected wages
in period i.13 However, the standard, negative substitution eect of higher taxes on labor
supply pulls in the opposite direction. We assume that 1  2 so that the substitution
eects in labor supply dominate the insurance eects. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)
and Meghir and Phillips (2010) survey a great deal of empirical studies demonstrating
that the compensated wage elasticities of labor supply are positive. If one would like to
interpret second-period labor supply as retirement, Gruber and Wise (1999) demonstrate
that the retirement age falls if the implicit tax on continued work increases.
Third, "c1t < 0 and "c2t < 0. These are unambiguous. The intuition is that a higher
labor tax lowers the price of leisure and induces substitution away from consumption
towards leisure.
Fourth, "l1R > 0 and "l2R < 0. A higher nancial return R induces individuals to have
relatively more consumption and leisure in the second-period and less consumption and
leisure in the rst period. Due to intertemporal substitution in leisure, labor supply in
the rst period increases and labor supply in the second period decreases. In addition,
there are wealth eects on labor supply in both periods due to intertemporal substi-
tution eects in consumption. Intuitively, a lower (higher) rst-period (second-period)
level of consumption raises (lowers) marginal utility of consumption in the rst (second)
period. Consequently, in the rst period the marginal willingness to pay for leisure,
i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, decreases and
labor supply expands. Similarly, in the second period the marginal willingness to pay
for leisure increases, so that labor supply diminishes. Thus, intertemporal substitution
eects in both leisure and consumption increase rst-period labor supply and decrease
second-period labor supply. Moreover, in case of "l1R, the interest rate also has a direct,
positive eect on the eective rst-period wage rate by increasing its net present value in
13i can be compared to the `coecient of residual income progression', which is the elasticity of
after-tax income with respect to before-tax income, see, e.g., Musgrave and Musgrave (1976).
15terms of second period consumption, which is the num eraire commodity. Whilst "l2R < 0
can be signed independently of any assumption on parameters, "l1R can turn ambiguous
under risk. If  < 0, a sucient condition for "l1R > 0 is that the `elasticity of resid-




which is equivalent to assuming 0
1 > 1. This restriction is harmless when the bivariate
distribution of skill shocks is normal and should also hold more generally under mild
conditions (see Appendix B). Not many studies directly estimate the interest elasticity
of labor supply. Nevertheless, Pirttil a and Suoniemi (2010) and Gordon and Kopczuk
(2011) demonstrate that average labor supply falls with larger capital incomes. This sug-
gests that the income-weighted elasticity !"l1R+(1   !)"l2R is negative. If one interprets
second-period labor supply as the retirement decision, the evidence in Gruber and Wise
(1999) supports the (unambiguous) result that retirement falls substantially if individuals
accumulate larger pension wealth ("l2R < 0).
To gain intuition for the optimal tax structure, we will rst discuss two special cases
before turning to the interpretation of the complete model. In the rst case, we assume
that rst-period labor supply is exogenous and that there is no rst-period labor income
risk. We label this the `working-for-retirement' model, as we could interpret second-
period labor supply as the (intensive) retirement decision. This structure of the model
corresponds to the setting analyzed in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b), and is similar
to Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986). This case corresponds to Cremer and Gahvari
(1995a, 1995b) because of the particular sequencing of household choices.14 In particu-
lar, the tax base of the pre-committed good in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b) is
deterministic. In our intertemporal setting, the pre-committed good corresponds to rst-
period consumption. As a result, the saving base is deterministic given that rst-period
labor income is exogenous. In this case, subsidizing rst-period consumption is equivalent
to taxing savings.
In the second case, we assume that second-period labor supply is exogenous and
there is no second-period labor-income risk. This model is denoted as the `saving-for-
retirement' model and extends the deterministic analyses in Ordover and Phelps (1979)
and Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) to allow for income risk. Although rst-period con-
sumption is still deterministic, savings are not, since the earnings shock occurs after
rst-period consumption and leisure choices have been made. Consequently, in contrast
to the working-for-retirement model (and Cremer and Gahvari, 1995a, 1995b) the savings
base is now stochastic. Therefore, subsidizing rst-period consumption is no longer equiv-
alent to taxing savings. Our particular sequencing of the risk realization and household
decisions also distinguishes our paper from the new dynamic public nance literature,
where savings in each period are determined after the realization of risk in that period,
and not before. See, for example, Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi
14Equations (18a) and (18b) in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) correspond to our equations (37) and (38).
16and Sleet (2006), and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006).
4 Working-for-retirement: exogenous rst-period lei-
sure
In case rst-period labor supply is exogenous (but can in principle be positive, i.e., ! > 0),
and if there is no income risk in the rst period, we have "l1t = "l1R = 1 = 0. Labor
supply can in this case also be interpreted as the retirement decision. We nd from
equations (35) and (36) the following rst-order conditions for the optimal labor and
capital-income tax:






















Expression (37) demonstrates that the labor tax is set in such a way that the marginal
benets in terms of larger social insurance (1   !)2 are equated to the net marginal dead
weight costs of doing so. The net costs consist of two eects. First, a higher labor tax
distorts labor supply more heavily as indicated by   t
1 t (1   !)"l2t > 0. Second, provided
that capital income is taxed, and households thus tend to consume too much in the rst




The intuition for (38) is simpler. Taxes on savings are used for eciency reasons only,
since the capital-tax base is deterministic. Therefore, capital taxes do not reduce the
variance in risky labor earnings. Thus, capital-income taxes have no insurance benets,
and the insurance characteristic 2 is absent in equation (38). The only role of the tax on
saving is to mitigate the distortions on labor supply. The rst term on the right-hand side
gives the benets of smaller labor supply distortions (  t
1 t (1   !)"l2R > 0). A larger
capital tax boosts second-period labor supply, since a capital tax generates a wealth eect
on second-period labor supply due to intertemporal substitution eects in consumption.
Note that there is no direct intertemporal substitution in leisure demand with leisure
being chosen in one period only. The second term represents the costs of a saving tax in
terms of a distorted pattern of consumption over the life cycle (
r=R
1 t "c1R < 0).









^ t > 0: (39)
Equation (39) demonstrates that a dual income tax with both positive taxes on capital
income and labor income is optimal as long as the labor tax is used for insurance (t > 0).
Below we will show that this is indeed the case. By boosting labor supply the capital tax
alleviates the labor tax distortions associated with insuring labor income risks. Savings
and second-period labor supply are substitutes. Therefore, taxing savings helps to re-
duce distortions in labor supply. The stronger the complementarity between rst-period
consumption and second-period labor supply, the larger is "l2R, and the higher should be
the capital tax. If the distortions in saving are larger, "c1R increases, and optimal capital-
income taxes should be set at lower levels. If more consumption is allocated towards
the second-period of the life cycle,  is smaller and capital taxes are less distortionary.
Hence, optimal capital taxes can be higher. Similarly, if relatively more labor income
is earned in the second period, (1   !) is larger and the larger are the eciency gains
of taxes on capital income. Optimal capital taxes would only be zero when savings and
labor supply would not be substitutes ("l2R = 0), capital-income taxes would be innitely
distortionary ("c1R = 1), or second-period labor income would be zero (! = 1). None of
these conditions are fullled with standard preferences.
By using the optimal dual income tax we can obtain the following expression for the
optimal labor tax at the optimal capital tax:
^ t







The expression for the optimal labor tax illuminates the trade-o between insurance
(numerator) and incentives (denominator). The optimal labor tax increases with the
insurance characteristic of labor income. The more risky is second-period labor income,
the larger is 2, and the larger are the social gains from insurance. The optimal labor
tax decreases with the compensated tax elasticity of labor supply. The higher is the
elasticity "l2t < 0 in absolute value, the more labor supply responds to taxation, and
the lower should be the optimal labor tax rate. From the denominator in the expression
for social insurance follows that capital taxes allow for more social insurance { ceteris
paribus 2 { if labor income is a stronger substitute for savings, i.e., when
"l2R
"c1R > 0 is
larger. By taxing capital income, the government reduces labor-tax distortions in social
insurance, and optimal labor taxes can be set higher accordingly. When the government
15We borrowed the `dual-income tax' terminology from the Nordic countries, since we want to empha-
size the separate taxation of capital and labor incomes. However, in the Nordic countries the dual-income
tax is usually referred to as a at-rate capital-income tax combined with a progressive-rate labor-income
tax, where the tax rate in the lowest tax bracket of the labor-income tax corresponds to the capital-income
tax rate.
18would not be interested in providing social insurance (2 = 0) both the labor and capital
tax would be zero.16
The capital tax is optimally employed irrespective of the preference structure of the
households. In particular, the elasticities are not zero even when preferences are separable
and sub-utility over consumption is homothetic, cf. the elasticities in Table 1. These
are the standard conditions to obtain zero optimal capital-income taxes (no commodity
tax dierentiation) in deterministic models with linear instruments (cf. Sandmo, 1974;
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Deaton, 1979; Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980). Hence, the
Atkinson-Stiglitz no commodity tax-dierentiation result breaks down under risk, as has
been demonstrated before by Cremer and Gahvari (1995a).
Our analysis replicates the ndings in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a), but sheds a
dierent light on their explanation. This also aects the interpretation of optimal non-
linear policies in Cremer and Gahvari (1995b). Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) cast their
model in terms of optimal commodity taxes rather than labor income and capital-income
taxes. They argue that commodity taxes should optimally be dierentiated. In particular,
the tax on the `pre-committed' commodity (c1) should be lower than that on the `post-
committed' commodity (c2). This nding corresponds to our result of the desirability of
capital-income taxes.
Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b) argue that commodity tax dierentiation is op-
timal to reduce `underconsumption' and `overconsumption' of pre- and post-committed
goods { relative to a rst-best rule with perfect insurance markets. In our reading of
Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b), it is implicitly assumed that under- and overcon-
sumption cause externalities that need to be internalized by adjusting tax policy. In our
setting, the argument would then be that there is (precautionary) oversaving. Following
the interpretation of Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b), the government would thus
like to correct this oversaving by levying a tax on saving.
We think that this explanation needs to be revised. The chosen terminology `over-
consumption' (`underconsumption') only refers to a rst-best situation. However, in the
second-best setting that both Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b) and we analyze, this
under- or overconsumption needs no corrective government action. The reason is that
individuals optimally reduce their risk exposure through self-insurance in the form of pre-
cautionary saving. Government intervention to reduce or increase saving only upsets the
optimal private exposure to labor-market risk, since taxes on saving themselves do not
reduce income risk as the tax base is deterministic. Levying a saving tax (and rebating
the revenue in the form of transfers) would therefore not reduce the exposure of house-
holds to income risk, while at the same time it would create (larger) distortions in the
16If capital taxation were not available, the optimal labor tax in equation (40) would collapse to the
standard trade-o between insurance and direct distortions in labor supply, as sketched in Eaton and
Rosen (1980).
19saving decision. Consequently, such a policy cannot be welfare improving. The reason
why commodity tax dierentiation is optimal is that such a policy alleviates labor-supply
distortions in social insurance caused by the labor tax. Hence, it allows for more social
insurance in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b) and in our model. Indeed, Lemma 1
in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) implies complementarity between (second-period) labor
supply and rst-period consumption, like in our model.
Finally, if one interprets labor supply as the retirement decision, our results indicate
that (retirement) savings should optimally be taxed as long as the labor tax directly
distorts the retirement decision. Consequently, in an optimal social insurance scheme it
is not desirable to have actuarially neutral pension saving schemes, i.e., a zero net tax on
pension saving. Moreover, if the aim is to raise the eective retirement age, this could be
indirectly achieved by increasing the tax burden on (pension) savings.
We summarize the ndings of this section in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. (Exogenous rst-period leisure) The optimal capital tax is positive and
the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem breaks down. The capital tax is not used for social insurance,
but only to o-set distortions on second-period labor supply. The optimal capital tax
increases if the capital tax boosts second-period labor supply more and if it features fewer
distortions in saving.
5 Saving-for-retirement: exogenous second-period lei-
sure
Our second special case is concerned with exogenous and non-stochastic second-period
labor income: "l2t = "l2R = 2 = 0. In this case, we assume that households choose leisure
only when young, and save in order to nance their retirement consumption. Still, they
can have some exogenous labor supply when old (i.e., ! < 1). From equations (35) and
























Equation (41) is the optimum condition of the labor tax where the eective marginal
insurance benets (!1 > 0), are equated with the marginal eciency costs of the labor
tax. The net marginal costs of employing a larger labor tax consist of two elements. First,






!"l1t > 0. Second, intertemporal distortions will be smaller when the labor tax





"c1t < 0. Intuitively, the labor tax reduces rst-period
20consumption demand, and this alleviates the distortions on rst-period consumption from
a positive capital-income tax. When the capital-income tax is zero, only the labor tax
determines the distortions in labor supply.
Equation (42) is the optimum condition for the capital-income tax. The marginal in-
surance benets (!1 > 0) are equal to the marginal eciency costs of the capital-income
tax. In contrast to the previous case (see section 4), the capital-income tax now features
insurance benets, since savings are stochastic. Indeed, a larger variance in rst-period
income shocks gives a larger variance in savings, since individuals with lower rst-period
labor income save less. The costs of employing the capital tax for social insurance are
two-fold. First, a larger capital-income tax entails larger intertemporal distortions in





"c1R > 0. This term was also present before.
Second, a larger capital-income tax exacerbates the labor tax distortions by acting as





!"l1R > 0. Intuitively,
the capital tax reduces rst-period labor supply, since intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption provokes a wealth eect on leisure demand in period one. The capital tax also
aects labor supply via the tax wedge on labor. In particular, the capital tax changes the
relative price of rst-period labor supply in terms of second-period consumption. The
capital tax did not feature in the tax wedge on labor in the previous model, because
the capital tax does not aect the relative price of second-period labor supply in terms
of second-period consumption. Again, there is no direct intertemporal substitution in
leisure, since individuals consume leisure only in the rst-period.
Compared to the previous model, the cross-elasticity of labor supply with respect to
the net interest rate has switched in sign. A larger capital tax lowers the net return on
saving and raises rst-period consumption relative to second-period consumption. As a
result, individuals would like to substitute rst-period consumption for rst-period leisure
and rst-period labor supply falls. Consequently, saving and rst-period labor supply are
complements. Capital-income taxes therefore do not reduce labor market distortions,
but exacerbate them. Indeed, reducing labor market distortions ceteris paribus requires
subsidies on capital income rather than taxes.
The insurance characteristic is identical in the expressions for both the labor and the
capital tax. Hence, insuring income through either labor or capital taxes provides the
same distributional benets. The reason is that the marginal propensity to save out of
rst-period labor income is equal to one, given that the rst-period consumption and
labor supply choices are committed before the earnings shock is realized. Consequently,
a tax on saving is equivalent to a tax on labor income in terms of reducing the variance
in earnings. Thus, whether labor income should be taxed at a higher rate than capital
income depends only on whether the marginal costs of employing labor taxes are lower
than the marginal costs of employing capital-income taxes. Therefore, an optimal policy
equalizes the marginal excess burdens of labor and capital taxes.
21We obtain the optimal Ramsey rule for the dual income tax structure by subtracting
equations (41) and (42) to nd
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^ t + ^ r= ^ R
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!
! ("l1t + "l1R): (43)
Our Ramsey rule is intuitively the same as the optimal dual income tax in deterministic
Ramsey models with saving for retirement (see, e.g., Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980, equa-
tion (32)), but now in case of providing optimal social insurance, rather than raising an
exogenous amount of tax revenue with distorting tax instruments.17
The left-hand side represents the total marginal welfare costs of distorting savings for
income insurance. The welfare costs of distorting savings increase with the tax wedge on
capital income
^ r= ^ R
1 ^ t , and the total elasticity of rst-period consumption ("c1t+"c1R) < 0,
which measures the behavioral response of the savings base with respect to both tax
instruments combined. Both elasticities are negative. A higher capital tax distorts saving
by boosting rst-period consumption. Additionally, a higher labor tax counters the saving
distortion by reducing rst-period consumption. "c1t + "c1R gives the combined eect of
a lower capital tax while simultaneously increasing the labor tax so as to keep income
insurance constant. Thus, simultaneously raising the labor tax and lowering the capital
tax (higher R), results in a lower distortion on consumption.
Similarly, the right-hand side gives the total marginal welfare cost of distorting labor
supply. The cost of distorting labor supply increase with the net tax wedge on labor
supply
^ t+^ r= ^ R
1 ^ t , and the total elasticity of the labor tax base !("l1t + "l1R) with respect
to the two policy instruments. At rst sight, the tax-base elasticity appears ambiguous.
On the one hand, an increase in labor taxation will decrease labor supply: "l1t < 0. On
the other hand, an increase in the net interest rate boosts labor supply: "l1R > 0. By
substituting the elasticities (see Table 1), we nd that the net eect is always negative:




1 t < 0 (for "2 = 0). Hence, simultaneously raising the labor tax and
lowering the capital tax (higher R), while keeping insurance constant, results in a larger
distortion on labor supply.
Accordingly, both tax wedges in (43) have the same sign at the optimum. Distortions
in rst-period labor supply by a non-zero total tax wedge on labor supply should be
equal to the distortions in saving by a non-zero tax wedge on saving. Therefore, capital
income is optimally taxed (subsidized) at a positive rate ^ r= ^ R > 0 (< 0) if labor income
is taxed (subsidized) on a net basis, i.e., if
^ t+^ r= ^ R
1 ^ t > 0 (< 0). Below we demonstrate
that the net tax on labor is always positive so that capital income should always be
17Note that there is an important dierence with Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) in the optimal tax
formula, which is due to the fact that we cannot employ the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix. Conse-
quently, in our optimal Ramsey rule the terms in brackets contain the elasticity of one tax base with
respect to all policy instruments employed, rather than the elasticity of all tax bases with respect to one
policy instrument employed.
22taxed. Intuitively, starting from a situation without taxes on capital income, introducing
a small tax on capital income, while lowering the labor tax at the same time, would
produce no change in insurance benets, since both instruments have identical insurance
gains. Also, starting from a zero capital tax, the introduction of a small capital tax would
only generate second-order intertemporal distortions in consumption. However, it would
allow for a rst-order reduction in labor-supply distortions by lowering the labor tax.
Thus, taxing capital income helps to achieve the same insurance at lower eciency costs.
From this discussion follows that the intuition from the working-for-retirement model
does not apply to the saving-for-retirement model. The government may like to provide
a subsidy on saving, rather than a tax on saving, so as to reduce labor-supply distortions.
However, a saving subsidy would raise the exposure of households to income risk, since
savings are stochastic. The increase in labor taxes needed to maintain the same level of
social insurance increases labor supply distortions so much that this would more than
o-set the positive eect of the capital subsidy on labor supply. Hence, it is never optimal
to subsidize savings in the saving-for-retirement model.
The Atkinson-Stiglitz uniform commodity-tax result can again never be obtained as
long as standard utility functions are adopted. In particular, zero taxation of capital in-
come would require either that savings are innitely elastic, or (rst-period) labor supply
is completely inelastic. In these knife-edge cases the capital tax is either innitely distor-
tionary or the labor tax is completely non-distortionary. Consequently, in stark contrast
to the deterministic Ramsey models, positive taxation of capital income is unambiguously
part of the optimal tax policy under income risk.
By substituting (43) into the reduced rst order conditions (41) and (42), and rear-
ranging and collecting terms, we nd that the total net tax on labor (i.e., the direct tax
on labor plus the implicit tax on labor due to the capital tax) satises
^ t + ^ r= ^ R









The optimal net tax on labor is positive by substituting the elasticities from Table 1.
Equation (44) gives the standard trade-o between social insurance (numerator) and
distortions (denominator) and proves that the capital-income tax is optimally positive,
cf. (43).
The denominator represents the net distortions of taxing labor income, which decrease
the optimal tax wedge on labor income. In particular, distortions of social insurance
increase with the tax elasticity of labor supply  "l1t > 0. Like before, the second term in
the denominator, "c1t
"l1R
"c1R > 0, captures the interaction between labor supply and saving.
The stronger the substitutability between rst-period consumption and rst-period labor
supply, the larger (in absolute value) is
"l1R
"c1R < 0. Thus, if capital taxes are higher, labor
23taxes should be lower as they exacerbate the distortions of the capital tax on labor supply.
The interaction term is smaller if the cross-elasticity of consumption with respect to the
labor tax ("c1t < 0) is smaller (in absolute value). In that case, a higher labor tax does
not exacerbate labor supply distortions a lot.
The term in the numerator contains the standard, direct insurance gain of labor
taxes 1 > 0. In addition, there is also an indirect insurance gain of labor taxes, since
"c1t
1
"c1R > 0. Intuitively, the labor tax reduces rst-period consumption "c1t < 0, and
thereby reduces the distortions of the capital tax on consumption choices. As a result,
the trade-o between insurance and distortions of employing capital taxes improves, as
indicated by the term
1
"c1R < 0. Therefore, the optimal wedge on labor should increase
as well.
By using the optimal tax wedge on labor (44) in the optimal dual tax structure in
equation (43), we obtain the optimal capital tax rate
^ r= ^ R













Upon substitution of the relevant elasticities from Table 1, we can derive that the optimal
capital tax is indeed unambiguously positive and increases with the desire to insure risk
in rst-period income 1. As before, a lower  implies that more consumption is allocated
towards the second period of the life cycle, so that capital taxes are less distortionary.
Hence, optimal capital taxes can be higher. Furthermore, the total insurance eect is
increasing in risky labor income. Consequently, a higher share ! of rst-period labor
income in total labor income calls for a higher capital tax rate.
The denominator in brackets represents the welfare cost of the capital tax. Welfare
losses of capital-income taxes increase in the elasticity of consumption with respect to
the interest rate ( "c1R > 0). Capital taxes exacerbate the distortions of the labor tax
on labor supply, so that the eciency losses in saving increase further, cf. "l1R
"c1t
"l1t > 0.
The rst term in the numerator, 1, designates the direct insurance gain of capital
taxes, whereas "l1R
1
"l1t < 0 represents again the indirect insurance eect. Capital taxes
should be higher if this provides a lot of distributional benets. However, by lowering
rst-period labor supply ("l1R > 0), capital-income taxes worsen the insurance-incentives
trade-o of the labor tax, which is captured by
1
"l1t < 0. As a result, capital-income taxes
reduce the attractiveness of using labor-income taxes to insure income risks, and should
be lowered accordingly.
We can eliminate r
R from the optimal wedge on labor supply in equation (44) to nd
24the optimal labor tax
^ t

















The labor tax is generally ambiguous in sign. The reason is that the capital tax is part
of the labor wedge. If the optimal capital tax becomes larger, a negative labor tax t < 0
might be necessary in order maintain the optimal net tax wedge on labor (t+r
1 t > 0).
The condition for optimally positive labor taxes is ! ("l1t + "l1R) > ("c1t + "c1R). This












We assume that this condition holds and that the labor tax is optimally positive. Note,
however, that the sign of the capital tax does not depend on this assumption, so the
result that capital income should optimally be taxed remains unchanged.
To conclude, subsidies on saving could boost labor supply of the young workers in the
saving-for-retirement model. However, this is not an optimal policy. A negative capital
tax raises the exposure to labor income risk. Hence, a rise in the labor tax is needed to
maintain the same level of insurance. Intuitively, keeping the level of income insurance
constant implies that the labor tax needs to increase as the capital tax is lowered. How-
ever, a negative capital tax combined with a higher labor tax so as to keep the level of
social insurance constant generates larger distortions. The reason is that the rise in the
labor tax more than o-sets the positive impact of the saving subsidy on labor supply.
Consequently, capital income (i.e., retirement income in this context) should not be sub-
sidized, but taxed so as to provide social insurance at the lowest social cost. Therefore,
these results suggest that policies to subsidize retirement plans are questionable, because
the distortions associated with a rise in the tax burden to complement the tax subsidies
outweigh their benecial eects on labor supply.
We summarize the results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (Exogenous second-period leisure) The optimal capital tax is positive and
the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem breaks down. The capital-income tax is equally eective as
the labor tax in providing social insurance. The optimal capital tax increases with the
welfare gains of social insurance, but decreases with distortions in saving and rst-period
labor supply.
256 General model
In the general model, in which labor supply in both periods is endogenous, not only the
two mechanisms highlighted in the sub-models are present (intertemporal wealth eects
in labor supply and insurance of rst-period labor-income risk), but a third factor will
determine the desirability of capital-income taxes: intertemporal substitution eects in
labor supply. This section discusses the model in full.
We obtain the following expression describing the optimal labor tax from rearranging
equation (35):
















The expression for the optimal labor tax equates the insurance gains of reducing risk
in rst- and second period incomes, !1 + (1   !)2, to the net marginal cost of doing
so. The welfare costs of labor taxes are represented by three terms. The rst two terms
give the marginal excess burdens of labor taxes on rst- and second period labor supply,
respectively. Note that  !"l1t > 0, and  (1   !)"l2t > 0. The last term gives the
reduction in the excess burden of a positive capital tax, since the labor tax partially
o-sets the saving distortion by discouraging rst-period consumption ("c1t < 0).

















In contrast to the labor-income tax, the capital tax can only be employed for insurance
to reduce the risk of rst-period incomes (!1), not second-period incomes ((1   !)2).
The reason is that the second-period income shock occurs after savings have been made.
Hence, taxing savings does not help to reduce the variance of incomes in the second
period of the life cycle. The marginal insurance gains !1 should again be equal to the
net marginal dead weight loss associated with more income insurance. In particular, a
capital tax causes the standard saving distortion which is represented by  
r=R
1 t "c1R >
0. Moreover, the capital tax exacerbates the labor tax distortions on rst-period labor
supply, since !"l1R > 0. This is, rst, due to wealth eects arising from intertemporal
substitution in consumption. Second, in the general model with endogenous labor supply
in both periods, capital taxes also generate direct intertemporal substitution eects on
leisure demands so that rst-period labor supply falls. Finally, the capital tax reduces
distortions in second-period labor supply, because t
1 t(1   !)"l2R < 0 for positive labor
taxes. Wealth eects due to intertemporal substitution in consumption and intertemporal
substitution in leisure both raise second-period labor supply.
26By combining both equations, we obtain the optimal dual tax structure:

^ r=R
1   ^ t

 ("c1t + "c1R) =
^ t + ^ r=R
1   ^ t

! ("l1t + "l1R) (50)
+
 ^ t
1   ^ t

(1   !)("l2t + "l2R) + (1   !)2:
The optimal capital tax is determined by four elements. The two elements in the rst
line are identical to the expression for the optimal capital tax of the previous section, see
equation (43).
First, the optimal capital-income tax
^ r=R
1 ^ t is larger if rst-period consumption has
a lower total elasticity with respect to the policy instruments and the income share of
consumption today is lower (lower ), so that  ("c1t + "c1R) < 0 is lower in absolute
value. Naturally, the capital tax distorts intertemporal consumption choices ("c1R < 0).
However, the labor tax reduces the capital-tax distortions by reducing consumption in
the rst period ("c1t < 0) { provided that the capital tax is positive. The net eect is
negative, see also the previous section.






! ("l1t + "l1R) is higher in absolute value. The distortion is larger if
individuals earn a relatively large fraction of their life-time income ! in the rst period.
The intuition for this term is identical to the model with only endogenous rst-period
labor supply. In particular, a capital subsidy could be employed to reduce the labor
tax distortion. However, the rise in labor taxes to maintain the same level of income
insurance could more than o-set the positive eects of the capital subsidy on labor
supply. In contrast to the previous section the net eect is no longer unambiguous, since




1 t   1(1   2)(1   !)"2

? 0. Intuitively, in the current model
with endogenous leisure in both periods, intertemporal substitution eects in the pattern
of leisure demand over time provide an additional channel whereby capital-income taxes
aect labor supply, besides the wealth eects generated by intertemporal substitution
in consumption. In particular, a larger capital-income tax renders current leisure more
attractive than future leisure. As a result, the capital tax raises the distortion on rst-
period labor supply even further, thereby reducing the desire to tax capital incomes. This




1 ^ t(1   !)("l2t + "l2R) < 0 indicates the role of capital taxes to reduce the
tax distortion on second-period labor supply. The combined elasticity is unambiguously
signed: "l2t + "l2R < 0. A larger capital tax allows for a lower labor tax, so that labor
tax distortions on second-period labor supply diminish. In addition, a capital tax boosts
second-period labor supply through intertemporal substitution eects so that it alleviates
the distortions of the labor tax on second-period labor supply even more. Accordingly,
27a positive capital tax ceteris paribus allows for more social insurance by reducing the
distortions in second-period labor supply.
Fourth, the capital tax increases if labor taxes are less ecient in social insurance,
thus, if (1 !)2 is lower, i.e., if second-period risk is relatively less important compared to
rst-period income risk (note that the previous three terms discussed so far are negative).
Indeed, in the absence of second-period labor income risk (2), capital income is generally
taxed at positive rates if intertemporal substitution of leisure is modest, and if labor
supplies in both periods are taxed at net positive rates. Consequently, capital-income
taxes alleviate labor-supply distortions in social insurance. However, if second-period
labor income is substantially more risky than rst-period income, 2 is larger, and capital-
income taxes loose their attractiveness as an insurance device. Therefore, capital-income
taxes tend to be set lower.
We derive an explicit condition under which capital income should be taxed at positive
rates even if capital taxes do not provide any insurance at all, i.e., if the saving base is
deterministic. Capital-income taxes are then employed for eciency reasons only. In that







where  "lR  !"l1R + (1   !)"l2R denotes the income-weighted average elasticity of total
labor supply with respect to the interest factor, and "aR  !"l1R  "c1R > 0 denotes the
compensated interest rate elasticity of savings. "aR is unambiguously positive, because
a higher net interest rate increases rst-period labor supply ("l1R > 0) and it decreases
rst-period consumption ("c1R < 0). Therefore, capital income is taxed if labor income
is taxed (t > 0), and if the positive eect of capital-income taxes on second-period labor
supply ((1   !)"l2R < 0) is not o-set by the negative eect of capital-income taxes on
rst-period labor supply (!"l1R > 0).
The net eect thus depends on the intertemporal substitution pattern in labor supply
and the relative shares of labor earned in the rst- and the second-period of the life cycle
(!). Theoretically, the sign of the capital tax is ambiguous. Using cross-sectional data,
Pirttil a and Suoniemi (2010) and Gordon and Kopczuk (2011) estimate that labor supply
falls if households have higher capital incomes. As long as populations are stationary,
cross-sectional estimates are useful to sign the impact of capital income on life-time labor
supply. These ndings suggest that  "lR < 0, since average labor supply falls with higher
capital incomes.18 Additional evidence is provided by realistically calibrated life-cycle
models in Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Conesa et al. (2009). These authors nd that
18We note that these empirical ndings hold for aggregates. For some sub-groups estimates may be
imprecisely estimated or switch sign. However, since our model is concerned with aggregate outcomes,
we believe that we draw the correct inference from these studies.
28optimal capital taxes are generally positive for eciency reasons only. In particular, the
capital tax increases labor supply at later stages of the life cycle more than it decreases
labor supply at earlier stages. This evidence also suggests, therefore, that  "lR < 0.19
Accordingly, capital income should optimally be taxed, even if capital-income taxes do
not provide any insurance gains.
Returning to the general case where capital taxes also feature insurance gains, we
nd the optimal capital tax rate from solving equation (49) for the labor tax t
1 t and
substituting the resulting expression into equation (48). Naturally, this also gives the
result that the optimal capital tax should remain positive as long as we maintain the
assumption that  "lR < 0:20;21
^ r= ^ R
1   ^ t
=
!1 +  "lR
[!1+(1 !)2]
 "lt




where  "lt  !"l1t+(1 !)"l2t < 0 denotes the income-weighted average elasticity of total
labor supply with respect to the labor tax rate. "at  !"l1t   "c1t is the elasticity of
saving with respect to the labor tax. If "at > 0 ("at < 0), saving increases (decreases) as
a result of labor taxation. The sign of "at is ambiguous since labor taxation both reduces
labor supply (!"l1t < 0) and rst-period consumption ("c1t < 0).
The rst term in the denominator represents the direct distortions in savings, i.e.,
intertemporal distortions in rst-period consumption and in rst-period labor supply,
respectively. The larger are direct intertemporal distortions on consumption and leisure,
the larger is "aR > 0, and the lower the optimal capital tax should be. Labor taxation
mitigates distortions in savings, if labor taxes boost savings ("at > 0), but distort labor
supply ( "lt < 0). This trade-o is represented by "at
 "lt . If "at > 0 and  "lR < 0, capital
taxation boosts labor supply, and thereby alleviates the distortions of the labor tax on
labor supply. Therefore, capital taxes should be set higher. If, instead, "at < 0 and
 "lR < 0, a higher capital tax exacerbates the savings distortions of the labor tax by
boosting life-time labor supply. Thus,  "lR
"at
 "lt < 0, and capital taxation should decrease.
The numerator of equation (52) captures the insurance eects of capital taxes and
consists of two parts. First, there is the direct insurance eect !1. If taxing savings
reduces the exposure to rst-period income risk more, capital-income taxes should be
higher. This is analogous to the explanation in the saving-for-retirement case in section 5.
Additionally, the indirect insurance eect is at work. In particular, if the capital tax
boosts labor supply,  "lR < 0, the capital tax improves the insurance-incentives trade-
19Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) develop an OLG-model calibrated on US data. They demonstrate
that a positive tax on capital is desirable for social insurance as well if there is uninsurable wage risk.
20Second-order conditions for the optimal tax problem ensure that the denominator of the optimal tax
expression is positive.
21Note that the term exactly simplies to the optimal capital tax rule (45), if second-period labor
supply is inelastic ("l2t = "l2R = 0), and if there is no risk in the second period (2 = 0).
29o of the labor tax, since
[!1+(1 !)2]
 "lt < 0. As a result the labor tax becomes a more
attractive instrument for social insurance, and the capital tax should optimally increase.
To derive the optimal labor tax, we insert equation (52) into equation (49) and collect




!1 + (1   !)2 + "at
!1
"aR




The denominator shows that the optimal labor tax falls if providing social insurance is
more distortionary. The labor tax distorts labor supply as represented by the average
labor supply elasticity ( "lt < 0). However, the labor tax is larger if the capital tax is
helpful in reducing labor market distortions by indirectly boosting labor supply ( "lR < 0),
and if the labor tax strengthens the complementarity eect
 "lR
"aR < 0 by raising savings
("at > 0). Instead, if the labor tax reduces overall saving ("at < 0), it weakens the
complementarity eect of capital taxation. Consequently, distortions from labor taxation
will be exacerbated, and the labor tax should be set at a lower rate. The numerator
reveals that the optimal labor tax increases with the desire to insure income risk in both
periods (!1 +(1 !)2). Finally, there is the indirect insurance eect of the tax policy.
If "at is positive, the labor tax improves the insurance-incentives trade-o of the capital
tax. As a result, the optimal tax on labor income needs to be higher as a result. The
reverse reasoning holds if "at < 0.
In case the government can employ age-dependent labor-income taxes, the optimal
capital tax will unambiguously be positive.22 The reason is that the government can
eectively neutralize any eect of capital-income taxes on the intertemporal allocation of
leisure by appropriately adjusting the structure of labor-income taxes if age-dependent
labor-income taxes are available. Consequently, capital-income taxes are only employed
to reduce distortions on second-period labor supply and to insure rst-period labor-
income risk, as in the sub-models we discussed previously. Hence, our results would be
completely robust to introducing age-dependent labor-income taxation.
We conclude this section by summarizing our results in the nal proposition.
Proposition 3. (Leisure endogenous in both periods) The optimal capital tax is em-
ployed for both eciency and insurance reasons and the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem breaks
down. The capital tax is optimally positive if life-time labor supply increases with taxa-
tion of capital income. The optimal capital tax increases with its insurance gains and its
eectiveness to reduce life-time labor supply distortions. The capital-income tax decreases
if saving distortions are larger.
22An unpublished appendix demonstrates this formally, and is available upon request from the authors.
307 Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that capital income is generally taxed in a standard two-
period life-cycle model with non-insurable risks in both periods of the life cycle. The
Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem of non-dierentiation of commodity taxes breaks down under
risk. Intuitively, capital-income taxes boost second-period labor supply by making future
leisure more costly. Taxing capital income thus alleviates distortions in second-period la-
bor supply (or retirement). However, capital-income taxes reduce rst-period labor sup-
ply, but this eect is o-set because capital-income taxes insure rst-period labor-income
risk. Indeed, optimal social insurance requires that distortions associated with insur-
ance should be smoothed over labor income and saving bases. Capital-income taxes also
entail intertemporal distortions in leisure demands, which tend to lower optimal capital-
income taxes. However, as long as the increase in second-period labor supply dominates
the reduction in rst-period labor supply, life-time labor supply increases (which is the
empirically relevant case), and optimal capital-income taxes should unambiguously be
positive.
This paper employed linear policy instruments and conrmed results from the new
dynamic public nance literature, where rich sets of non-linear instruments are analyzed.
By directly implementing the optimal allocations with time-invariant linear tax instru-
ments, and without record keeping, we have demonstrated that the basic results derived
in the new dynamic public nance literature are robust to (very) large deviations from
the informational requirements to implement time-dependent, non-linear policies.
In contrast to the previous literature, we have also demonstrated that capital taxes
have a direct role in insuring labor-market risks, especially when labor risks are important
in the early stages of the life cycle. In all new dynamic public nance papers we are
aware of, savings in each period are chosen only after the skill shock is known to the
individual. Hence, there are no unintended, risky savings so that taxing capital income
features no social-insurance gains. We think that capital-income taxes could possibly
feature social-insurance gains in these models under a dierent sequencing of household
choices and realizations of earnings risk. However, it may also be the case that indirect
instruments are not desirable for social insurance at all under optimal non-linear labor-
income taxation, as is the case in deterministic models analyzing optimal commodity taxes
under optimal non-linear taxation, cf. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Mirrlees (1976) and
Jacobs and Boadway (2011). Further research is needed to explore these issues.
This paper showed that capital-income taxes are especially desirable if they help to
reduce tax distortions on labor supply that arise from social insurance. We conjecture
that this result is the mirror image of the nding that intertemporal wedges are opti-
mal in the literature employing non-linear instruments. Intertemporal wedges relax the
incentive constraints associated with social insurance as individuals with favorable skill
31shocks are less tempted to mimic individuals with unfavorable skill shocks. Jacobs (2012)
demonstrates that the main mechanism whereby incentive compatibility constraints can
be relaxed is indeed that labor supply is boosted. Future research could investigate this
conjecture in more detail, and thereby contribute to the understanding as to why the
intertemporal wedges in consumption are optimal in non-linear tax models.
Our ndings have large policy relevance for the debate on the desirability of capital-
income taxes. The introduction started with the controversy in the economics literature
on the desirability of capital-income taxation. This paper bolsters the recommendations
by Banks and Diamond (2010) and Diamond and Saez (2011) by showing that taxing
capital income is desirable when the earnings of households are risky. Moreover, it also
has relevance for policy discussions on the tax treatment of pension savings and stimu-
lating later retirement. We show that (retirement) saving should generally be taxed, and
not subsidized. Consequently, actuarially fair retirement schemes are not optimal. Gov-
ernments should therefore not try to subsidize retirement saving so as to reduce future
public spending on state pensions or health care. By doing this, sustainability problems
in public nances worsen rather than improve. As long as governments do not wish to
sacrice on social insurance, the government needs to raise the tax burden on working-age
individuals, which results in larger labor market distortions and smaller tax bases. More-
over, subsidies on (pension) saving exacerbate labor supply distortions by strengthening
the incentives to retire earlier. Hence, a policy of subsidies on (retirement) savings does
not help to delay retirement either.
A Derivatives of indirect utility
Using optimal second-period consumption, the indirect utility function (15) can be rewrit-
ten as
V (T;t;R)  u1(^ c1)   v1(^ l1) + E
h
u2((1   t)2^ l2 + (1 + (1   )r)^ a)   v2(^ l2)
i
(54)
= u1(^ c1)   v1(^ l1) + E
h
u2((1   t)2^ l2 + R[(1   t)1^ l1 + T   ^ c1])   v2(^ l2)
i
;
where R  1+(1   )r, and ^ a = (1 t)1^ l1 +T  ^ c1 from equation (2). By applying the
envelope theorem, the derivatives of indirect utility with respect to the policy instruments

















































2](T   c1) = RE[u
0
2]
(1   1)(1   t)E[1]l1   c1 + T
R
= 
(1   1)(1   t)l1   c1 + T
R
; (57)
where we have used Steiner's Rule for two stochastic variables X and Y , E[XY ] =





from equations (19) and (20), E[1] = 1, and the fact that rst-period labor supply l1 is
deterministic.
B Slutsky equations under risk
Under risk, compensated changes in labor supply and rst-period consumption can still
be derived using the Slutsky equations. These follow from dierentiating equations (21)
























; m = t;R; (59)
where X(t;R;V )  T is the expenditure function associated with the level of (expected)
indirect utility V .
Following the approach taken by Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, section 2.2), the critical
point is to determine the correct income transfer T to keep expected utility constant. We































2(R1l1 + 2l2)]dt (62)





By applying the households' rst-order conditions, the rst two lines in (62) vanish and
























(1   1)(1   t)l1   c1 + T
R
dR;
where the second equality results from applying Steiner's Rule, the denition of the
insurance characteristic, and E[1] = 0.
Keeping expected utility constant, dU = 0, we nd the necessary changes in lump-
sum income T (i.e, the change in the expenditure function X(t;R;V )) to compensate for
changes in the labor tax rate t or the net interest factor R:
dT
dt

















(1   1)(1   t)l1   c1 + T
R
: (65)
By inserting these expressions in the Slutsky equations (58) and (59), respectively, we
obtain the Slutsky equations (23){(28) in the main text.
C Compensated elasticities under risk
To derive the compensated elasticities, we log-linearize the rst-order conditions and the
expected utility function, where we set the change in the latter to zero. Log-linearization
provides a very powerful method to solve for the comparative statics of highly non-linear
models, as the system of linearized equations is linear in its relative changes. Since an
elasticity is just the ratio of the relative change of an endogenous variable with respect
to the relative change of a policy variable, the coecients in the solved linearized model
are just the elasticities we are looking for.
Deriving the elasticities from dierentiating the equations of the model with respect
to the policy variables is mathematically equivalent, but generally extremely cumber-
34some in highly non-linear models, and often so nontransparent that interpretation of the
elasticities becomes impossible.
We focus on the elasticities of expected consumption and labor supply in both periods
with respect to deterministic (expected) changes in policies. Hence, we can employ the
concept of global risk aversion (see, e.g., Varian, 1992, p. 380). We dene global relative











> 0 is a
measure for the expected compensated labor supply elasticity in period i = 1;2:
The log-linearized utility function is given by
c1u
0
1~ c1   l1v
0
1~ l1 + E[c2]E[u
0





2]~ l2 = 0; (66)
where a tilde (~) denotes a relative change, e.g., ~ ci 
E[dci]
E[ci] is the relative change in the
expected value of ci, and ~ li 
E[d(ili)]
E[ili] is the relative change in li, and where we used the
fact that E[d(2l2)] = E[2]E[dl2], because we are evaluating the change for a given 1,
and because l2 is chosen before 2 realizes.
Substituting the households' rst-order conditions for labor supply and consumption
in the linearized utility function, we nd, after rearranging,
Rc1~ c1 + E[c2]~ c2   (1   1)(1   t)RE[1]l1~ l1   (1   2)(1   t)E[2l2]~ l2 = 0: (67)
Hence,
~ c1 + (1   )~ c2   (1   1)(1   t)!~ l1   (1   2)(1   t)(1   !)~ l2 = 0; (68)
where we dened  
Rc1
RE[1]l1+E[2l2] and (1   ) =
E[c2]
RE[1]l1+E[2l2] as the expected ex-
penditure shares of consumption in both periods, and ! 
RE[1]l1
RE[1]l1+E[2l2] and 1   ! 
E[2l2]
RE[1]l1+E[2l2] as the expected share of labor income in period i = 1;2 in total labor income
(before taxes).
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2]E[i] > 0, as long as we assume non-increasing absolute risk aversion
(u000
2 > 0). Since the 0
i terms are normalized covariances, they are always smaller than or
equal to one: 0 < i  1.































Using the denitions of the labor supply elasticities and rearranging yields
~ l1 = "1

 ~ t + ~ R

  1"12~ c2; (77)




1 1  0 and 2 
1 0
2
1 2  0, since 0 < i  1.
Together with the linearized Euler consumption equation and the linearized utility
function we have a linear system of four equations in four unknowns, which can be solved
to nd the elasticities. First, substitute the linearized Euler equation (72) in the other
three linearized equations (68), (77), and (78) to nd
~ l1 =  "1~ t + "1 (1   1) ~ R   1"11~ c1; (79)














Use the rst two equations to substitute for ~ l1 and ~ l2 in the last equation to nd the
36solution of the model for ~ c1:














+ (1   1)!1"11 + (1   2)(1   !)2"21
#
~ c1:
Using the last result in (79), (80) and (72), we can write the solution of the complete
model as


























































+ (1   1)!1"11 + (1   2)(1   !)2"21 > 0; (87)




+ (1   1)!"1 (1   1)   (1   2)(1   !)"22: (89)
 is a measure for the weighted labor-supply elasticity, where the certainty equivalent of
each period's income is used as a weight.
We can sign the elasticities as follows. First, the consumption elasticities with respect
to the tax rate are unambiguously signed: "c1t < 0, "c2t < 0. Next, the elasticity of
second period consumption with respect to the interest factor is unambiguous as well,





1 t + (1   1)!"11

> 0. Second, as long as we assume
 < 0, the rst-period consumption elasticity with respect to the interest factor will be
negative, "c1R < 0 and standard saving behavior is obtained. This assumption holds true
if either there is no rst-period income, if 0
1   1 is suciently small, or if the labor
tax rate t is suciently high. For  < 0, a higher net interest factor makes rst-period
consumption less attractive and second-period consumption more attractive. These signs
of the elasticities would also be found in the absence of risk.
Third, the elasticity of second-period labor supply with respect to the interest factor






(1 t) + (1   1)!"11

> 0.
Moreover, if  is negative, then 0 < 1+
1
 < 1. Consequently, the rst-period labor supply




0 in that case. The latter assumption is equivalent to assuming 0
1 > 1. This is a
relatively weak requirement. For the special case of multivariate normally distributed skill
shocks, it can be shown that this assumption is equivalent to require (global) absolute
prudence being larger than (global) absolute risk aversion. The latter holds for most
utility functions and should also carry over to uncertainty under mild conditions.
Fourth, we assume that the substitution eect is dominant to obtain standard labor
supply behavior, i.e. "lit < 0. Thus, we impose 1   i
1









(1 1)!"1. Therefore, a sucient condition to ensure
standard behavior of labor supply is that the dierence between 1 and 2 is not too
large (or that they are close to being equal) such that 1  2 holds.
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